



A Citizen-Centered Political Roadmap for Systemic Transition in Ethiopia

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PART TWO:

THE MODALITIES OF AN IN-CONFLICT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

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Ethiopians are staring an imminent collapse of federal executive authority. Several large armed militia remain mobilized, territorial contests are intensifying, citizens are deeply insecure, and no state or non-state force possesses the capability and the legitimacy to impose a national settlement. The de facto military regime's myopic survival strategy divide-and-rule by fomenting inter-communal conflict has deepened polarization; haphazard economic liberalization has undermined livelihoods; public institutions have been hopelessly ethnicized and disintegrating; independent civic and political organizations remain enfeebled; and rigged elections and a flawed national dialog have exposed the shaky leg on which the regime stands.

This inauspicious environment makes post-conflict transition planning very difficult. As Part I of our Roadmap (Imbylta, 2023) argued, a government of national unity, led by a weak and hopelessly ethnicized opposition political parties, cannot secure a successful transition. The more credible, perhaps the only, alternative is a broad-based and citizen-focused coalition spearheading a save-the-country transition program.

The immediate task is to strike a stabilization bargain among violence-capable actors. Civilian, professional, religious, business, and community representatives are indispensable as a counterbalance: they moderate bargaining, protect the public interest,

supply administrative competence, monitor compliance, and progressively transfer authority from armed contenders to elected constitutional bodies. Our citizen-centered transition roadmap is built around delineated phases of actions led by an independent and impartial Ethiopian National Committee of the Wise (NCW | የጠቢቅን መመሪያ ርዕሰ ቤት), a Transition Charter, a caretaker administration of technocrats, and an elected Transitional Shengo with the legitimacy to oversee institutional overhaul.

We employ the conceptual framework of ‘political settlement’ to outline the transition program. The Ethiopia-tailored settlement rests on four inter-connected props. First, in phase one, the principal armed actors (mainly, the remnants of the federal forces, Fanno, TDA, and OLA) negotiate a stabilization and national continuity agreement covering ceasefires, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, territorial restraint, security coordination, and the timetable for demobilization or integration.

Second, given the absence of a neutral external body, a hegemonic Fanno serves as lead national guarantor of that agreement, acting through a joint enforcement mechanism rather than as an unconstrained occupying authority. This is because a coalition of equally capable armed groups with radically different political objectives is inherently conflict prone to execute a democratic transition.

Third, the NCW supplies political direction, civilian moderation, DDR preparation, and supervision of the caretaker administration (see CECA, 2026b, for details). Fourth, in phase two, an elected Transitional Shengo assumes constituent and legislative authority and concludes the transition period with a ratified democratic constitution and national elections.

The caretaker phase is narrow. It maintains essential services, public finance, humanitarian relief, public records, and ordinary law. It cannot redraw regional boundaries, adopt a permanent constitution, privatize strategic assets, alter ownership of land, grant blanket amnesties, or award long-term concessions. Full DDR cannot precede a credible security bargain. The Roadmap therefore sequences civilian-protection undertakings, local ceasefires, freeze-in-place arrangements, command and weapons registration, separation of forces, controlled cantonment, security-sector vetting, and finally integration or demobilization. The process is reciprocal, verified, and implementable.

As an indispensable Ethiopianist anchor, the Amhara Fanno is expected to play coordinating and enforcement roles, especially spearheading the initial security stabilization force. In exchange, it accepts rules of engagement, independent monitoring, civilian authorization for non-emergency national operations, protection of all communities, and automatic transfer of security oversight to the Transition Shengo (የሽንግሮ ሽንግሮ).

THE ETHIOPIAN SETTING

Unlike most countries, Ethiopia faces an in-conflict systemic transition rather than a post-conflict power succession. The spent force of the TPLF-PP ethnic-supremacist model of minority rule has produced institutionalized corruption, privileging of loyalty over merit, fragmentation of central-government institutions, and genocidal internecine warfare of all against all.

Ethiopia's current circumstances show proliferating civil strife and intensifying arms race that engages a total one million mobilized armed combatants, most of whom are under the control of nonstate actors. This means, the first component of the grand political settlement will be negotiated primarily among actors able to command organized force. That fact is not an endorsement of militarized politics; it is the starting condition for demilitarizing politics. Armed actors must be included because they can spoil or enforce agreements. Civilian actors must be included because combatant consent alone cannot authorize the permanent political order.

Fanno is treated as first among equals. Its organizational reach, fighting capability, sacrifice, and Ethiopian orientation make it the most plausible guarantor of national continuity in the event of regime collapse. The Tigray armed establishment and Oromo insurgent formations possess substantial territorial and coercive capabilities but currently pursue confederal or secessionist objectives. Remaining professional elements of the ENDF, federal police, and regional forces may also be coopted to become sources of continuity.

A political roadmap that addresses this settlement should not be confused with companion strategy declarations. One of these is a hard-nosed political diagnosis of the root causes of the existential crisis, including the balance of forces and their alignments. At the other end of diagnosis lies a political manifesto that defines the end point of the struggle (download our version of this Manifesto from www.enathager.org).

What bridges the two is a pan-Ethiopian transition roadmap that addresses the 'how' and 'when' of the struggle for liberty, encompassing an unavoidable armed resistance leg and an equally necessary non-violent civil disobedience leg. A good roadmap then is an action plan that is practical, sequenced (with timelines, phases, metrics, and milestones), and identifies challenges, resources, and opportunities.

These all mean that political ethnicity must be replaced by civic nationalism—based on equal citizenship and allegiance to the best of Ethiopian values, the rule of law, and loyalty to accountable state institutions. A well-designed political settlement, an accord that immediately ensures peace and stability, is imperative for undergirding free and fair elections based on a genuinely democratic constitution, addressing longstanding

grievances through a reconciliation and transitional justice mechanism, and restoring faith in government.

In the interest of transparency, a roadmap must identify the regime collapse scenarios under which it is fully applicable. These include a Fanno-led breakthrough toward Addis Ababa; a multipolar stalemate following federal disintegration; an internal ENDF move against the executive; negotiated withdrawal of the governing leadership; or a collapse in which some federal institutions continue while regional and local authorities invoke the secessionist clause (Article 39) of the current constitution.

The citizen-based roadmap architecture is optimized for the second and fifth scenarios, because they imply an outcome of assured mutual destruction. If Fanno becomes militarily predominant, the same restraints protect the legitimacy of its victory. If no actor is predominant, the joint mechanism provides a minimum structure for coordinated enforcement. Where federal institutions remain partially functional, they would be incorporated rather than automatically dissolved.

We propose a transition program comprising two phases:

- The first phase, under the transitional Council of the Wise, focuses on the tasks of peacemaking and stabilization. There is security or development without peace.
- The second phase, under the Transition Shengo, undertakes institutional overhaul to effect systemic change to pave the way for a democratic constitutional order.

PHASE ONE:

THE STABILIZATION AUTHORITY

Pre-collapse preparation: Selection to Enable Election

Ethiopia currently sits at an inflection point. The autocratic regime is teetering on the verge of collapse but still has enormous firepower and organizational network to lash out at a long beleaguered population. The fragmented opposition, the armed and the peaceful, has yet to forge an effective coalition with a workable strategy for overthrowing the regime with minimal damage and, more importantly, a shared vision of the social order that will replace the politics of contrived ethnic grievance and lawlessness. The severe shrinkage of civic space has eliminated peaceful political engagement.

The country therefore needs a well-tailored transition program as a waystation to meaningful electoral politics. Armed and activist groups need to go beyond the flawed logic of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ to forge a credible and positive compact of national unity built around a minimum program: a territorially indivisible Ethiopia, a politically unified citizenry, supremacy of the rule of law, equal citizenship, and peaceful dialog.

Several armed opposition groups (primarily: Fanno, TPLF, and OLA) have recently established an Alliance for Survival (AFS) which is essentially a mutual non-aggression pact aimed at toppling the regime with vague signals about what will replace it. We offer here a two-pronged strategy of systemic transition--regime change plus democracy building—to pave the way for an enduring democratic constitutional order.

Chaos should be avoided at all cost to eliminate the real risk of national disintegration. Currently, the country has two precarious options: a *pact of armed opposition groups* (AFS option) or a *national council of the wise* (NCW option).

The AFS option rests on an alliance of convenience among combatants with contradictory visions for the country and a sordid history of inter-group conflict. What unites them solely is the shared desire to overthrow a murderous regime. Furthermore, the yet unreleased pact lacks a clear enforcement mechanism a jointly crafted blueprint for a new political order. One of the following three conditions favor the enforcement of such a binding agreement: (a) There is a strong and impartial third party, (b) There is a hegemonic party in the coalition, or (c) A parity prevails in the balance of forces/allies, but unity of action is self-enforced by the shared end goals. None of these currently prevails, which is why our hope hangs on the quick emergence of Fanno as a hegemonic (dominant and yet accommodating) is critical for building a democratic and united Ethiopia.

The NCW option, on the other hand, rests on forging a working coalition of armed and non-armed interest groups in Ethiopian society. Well before the collapse, Ethiopian civic, professional, diaspora, political, and armed-movement interlocutors should establish a facilitator commission for national continuity. A Fanno-led security arm ensures order and backs the enforcement of the decisions of the national council. The NCW is not a government-in-waiting and does not claim sovereign authority. It prepares the legal, administrative, security, and humanitarian instruments needed during the first days of a vacuum.

Its work includes a draft stabilization agreement, Transition Charter template, proposed NCW roster and alternates, continuity plans for ministries and utilities, secure contact lists for senior public servants and judges, mapping of armed commands, local ceasefire templates, and protocols for protecting the treasury, central bank, public records, media, airports, telecommunications, and food corridors.

The Council should conduct confidential simulations of three contingencies: disappearance of the federal executive, fragmentation of national command, and contested control of Addis Ababa. Its products should be deposited in multiple secure locations and released when activation conditions are met.

Constituting and authorizing the NCW

Eligibility for membership of the Council is the most critical and contentious issue. The membership will have to be drawn from civil society organizations, respected secular

community leaders and civil servants, leaders of Ethiopian-nationalist political parties as well as ethnonationalist political parties willing to engage in the democratic transition program, independent businesspersons and academics, prominent religious leaders, prominent human rights activists at home and in the Diaspora. The selection criteria must include the following personal qualities: deep knowledge of the country, independent-mindedness, farsightedness, compassion, integrity, respect for diversity as well as the indivisible unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and richness of life and work experience.

The authority of the transition council cannot rest on moral prestige alone. A council of respected persons may possess legitimacy without the capacity to protect ministries, airports, banks, power stations, humanitarian routes, or mixed cities. Preferably, NCW's authority and mandate arise from a stabilization and national continuity agreement signed by the principal violence-capable actors and endorsed by a wider national civic stakeholders, following a brief national dialog process. In other words, the emergency authority becomes credible when these fundamental stakeholders recognize one another through a published compact (the transition charter), and an in-built deterrence is included so that no participant can achieve its essential aims outside that compact at tolerable cost.

The armed signatories provide the negative guarantee: none will overthrow the arrangement or pursue unilateral military advantage. Fanno, as a guardian, provides the lead positive guarantee: it organizes and, where authorized, supplies the principal force needed to protect common institutions and enforce agreed restrictions. Civilians and territorial representatives provide moderation, public scrutiny, and an independent basis for assessing whether enforcement serves the compact rather than factional expansion.

This is not equal power sharing. It is differentiated power sharing by function. Military capability weighs most heavily in security implementation; territorial acceptance matters most in local administration and deployment; civilian and professional competence matters most in rights protection, finance, justice, and administration; elected authority becomes supreme in managing the process and content of constitution making. The bottom line is that transition must join incomplete sources of authority rather than pretend that one source is sufficient.

Civilian groups cannot presently command the transition because they engage peacefully and organized engagement is weak at present. But, if better organized, they can prevent armed bargaining from becoming a closed division of the state. Their functions are to chair selected deliberations, document decisions, review humanitarian and rights performance, nominate technocrats and judges, monitor public finance, organize public consultation, and communicate the settlement to citizens and external partners.

The aim is progressive civilianization with a ratchet to avoid backsliding into partisan conflict. Civilian authority begins as moderation and oversight, expands through the

elected Transitional Shengo, and becomes supreme when the permanent constitution enters into force.

The bottom line is that NCW should be a political direction and compact-supervision body, not a substitute legislature, military headquarters, court, and cabinet combined. A membership of roughly forty-five to fifty allows for a sufficiently broad representation without making daily administration impossible.

Its composition should reflect the real settlement that would ensure a post-ethnic dispensation. One bloc should represent armed signatories and professional continuity forces; a second should represent territorial and local administrations; and a third should consist of civilian, religious, business, professional, women's, humanitarian, opposition political party, and rights representatives.

There is a dilemma here involving organizational representation and citizen-centered systemic change. Because armed signatories, territorial administrations, and most opposition parties are ethnic-based, the transition can easily be hijacked by supporters of the failed status quo. Three safeguards are compelling: *participants must consent to the compact that embraces the principles of citizen sovereignty and equality, and national unity; Fanno should be well represented in the council, and civilians in the NCW should preferably form a governing majority.* If the genuine reason for an anti-government rebellion is indeed the absence of democracy, a democracy pact should incentivize everyone to honor the transition pact.

Fundamental decisions by NCW will likely require concurrent consent: a two-thirds vote of the whole Council. Fundamental matters include national deployments, changes to the Charter, appointment or removal of the caretaker prime minister, emergency taxation, extension of the transition period, and election of the Transitional Shengo.

The emergency compact should activate only when ordinary federal executive authority has demonstrably ceased or become incapable of performing core functions. Relevant triggers include flight, death, resignation, detention, or disappearance of the executive leadership; inability of the cabinet to meet; abandonment of national command; competing claims to federal authority; or breakdown of treasury, security, and administrative direction.

Activation should be confirmed by several independent sources: available senior judges, the public-service continuity secretariat, representatives of multiple territorial administrations, and at least two major armed signatories including the lead guarantor. No armed actor should be able to manufacture collapse unilaterally and then invoke the compact to legalize its advance.

The caretaker government

The caretaker government should be small, technocratic, and administratively continuous. Its prime minister and cabinet ministers should be selected for competence, integrity, and ability to serve rival political authorities. Serving armed commanders should not hold civilian portfolios. Existing civil servants remain in office unless individually suspended for serious misconduct or inability to perform.

The caretaker mandate covers public services, humanitarian relief, ordinary revenue and expenditure, monetary continuity, restoration of transport and communications, protection of public records and assets, and execution of NCW decisions consistent with the Charter. All extraordinary expenditure and procurement should be published and audited.

The caretaker government may not redraw territories, adopt permanent economic ideology, privatize land or strategic enterprises, grant long concessions, incur nonessential sovereign debt, abolish regional institutions, or determine the permanent constitutional order. These prohibitions protect the transition from becoming government by irreversible emergency decree.

Existing laws and institutions should continue provisionally unless suspended by the transition Charter or inconsistent with its protected rights schedule. Collective dissolution of federal and regional legislatures may be politically tempting, but continuity is safer where institutions retain any lawful capacity. Nonfunctioning bodies may be replaced temporarily through transparent interim arrangements subject to later electoral authorization.

An interim constitutional and rights chamber composed of respected Ethiopian judges should review detention, confiscation, emergency decrees, jurisdictional disputes, and alleged violations by any signatory. The NCW appoints judges through a plural nomination process but does not supervise their decisions. Courts remain institutionally separate from the Council and the security services.

Joint security guarantee mechanism

The stabilization pact requires an enforcer. A Joint Security Guarantee Mechanism (JSGM) should be established that combines a joint security council, a national stabilization command, regional liaison centers, and an independent verification mission. Fanno serves as lead guarantor and supplies the initial commander and the largest operational contingent. Other signatories contribute liaison officers and, when vetted, units assigned to specific missions.

The JSGM is not a coalition government of national unity, and does not decide constitutional policy. It protects designated national institutions, prevents attacks on civilians, enforces ceasefire lines, secures humanitarian corridors, protects international borders, and

implements verified weapons-control measures. Its authority derives from the transition Charter and NCW decisions.

Addis Ababa and other multiethnic cities

A battle for Addis Ababa could endanger the historic Ethiopian state the transition seeks to preserve. Before the impending collapse of government, armed actors should be pressed to accept a capital non-combat compact. Heavy formations remain outside a defined security perimeter; critical sites are protected by vetted professional units and mixed liaison teams; and no movement displays partisan flags or establishes a separate detention or tax system in the city.

The same approach should apply to Dire Dawa, Harar, Hawassa, Jimma, Adama, Assela, and other mixed or contested cities. Municipal services and property records continue; residents are protected regardless of identity; and local administrative changes await lawful transitional procedures. Urban control must not become the prize that determines national legitimacy.

Ceasefire, violence reduction, DDR, and security reform

Stabilization comes before full DDR. Full disarmament is impossible while combatants fear attack and no trusted authority can protect them. Phase One of the transition program therefore underscores community violence reduction and reciprocal security measures even without a comprehensive peace. Current UN practice recognizes that DDR-related tools may be used where no peace agreement exists and drivers of violence continue.

The sequence, based on country experiences, is as follows:

- civilian-protection declarations;
- local ceasefires; freeze-in-place orders;
- opening of humanitarian corridors; command registration;
- mapping of forces and detention sites;
- identification of heavy weapons;
- separation around towns and infrastructure;
- verified storage or cantonment of selected weapons; and only then
- negotiated integration or demobilization.

Just as importantly, benefits should follow verified compliance. Units that protect civilians and honor ceasefires gain access to food, medical assistance, communications, training, and negotiated political participation. Units that violate the compact face public attribution, exclusion from benefits, targeted sanctions, and, where necessary, proportionate enforcement by the JSGM.

The long-term objective in undertaking security-sector reconstruction is a unified and constitutionally commanded national defense force, professional federal services, and regionally accountable police operating under national standards. Integration should be individual and unit-based, not an amalgamation of intact party armies. Vetting should focus on competence, command responsibility, serious abuse, and willingness to take a constitutional oath.

Professional ENDF personnel should be invited to preserve legitimate defense capabilities. Regional and insurgent forces may enter the national military, regional police, reserve service, or civilian reintegration according to need and qualification. As the Amhara experience amply demonstrates, no community should be left defenseless while rivals retain mobilized formations. Reductions must therefore be reciprocal, measurable, and verifiable.

Territorial continuity

Existing regional and local boundaries, languages, administrations, and ordinary competences should continue provisionally without prejudice to reform. Where regional institutions have collapsed, temporary administrative councils may be established through local consultation and NCW confirmation. Their mandate is service continuity, not permanent territorial sovereignty.

A territorial administration commission should map disputes, displaced populations, fiscal flows, minority protections, administrative viability, and alternative boundary models. Its findings go to the elected Transitional Shengo and the constitutional process. No armed occupation creates a presumption of lawful title.

National agreement will not automatically resolve local conflict. Regional liaison centers should facilitate local security and administrative compacts among community representatives, militia commanders, police, religious leaders, and municipal officials. These agreements may regulate markets, roads, grazing routes, displaced-person returns, schools, and joint monitoring.

However, local compacts must be subordinate to the Charter's rights provisions. They cannot authorize exclusion, population transfer, collective liability, or permanent boundary change. Their purpose is to create islands of predictable order that reinforce the national transition from below.

PHASE TWO:

THE SHENGO AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

The legitimacy of NCW is derivative and emergency-based. Within six to nine months, security conditions permitting, authority will go to a Transitional Shengo that combines

elected territorial representation with narrowly defined supplementary representation for displaced citizens, women, civic organizations, professional bodies, the Diaspora, and communities unable to vote safely.

Woreda-level elections may be useful where administration and security are credible, but a 1,400–1,700-member national body would be unwieldy. Local elections should generate territorial electoral colleges that choose a federal Shengo of approximately 350–450 members. Supplementary appointed members should constitute a small, fixed share and be selected through published criteria.

Categorical disqualification of top ruling party officials should be contemplated. If possible, however, collective exclusion should be replaced with individualized eligibility rules. Persons credibly implicated in atrocity crimes, major corruption, or violent obstruction may be suspended through due process.

The mandate of the transitional Shengo

The duly elected Shengo becomes the interim legislature, assumes the responsibility of supervising the caretaker government, approves the transition budget, reviews security operations, enacts institutional reforms, and oversees the constitutional process.

The Shengo should establish various advisory commissions, including one for peace, truth, and transitional justice, state and party assets, electoral laws, territorial administration, land tenure, population census, constitutional design, and public administration. Commission findings should be published and publicly debated.

Constitution: process and content

The permanent constitution must be drafted under the auspices of representatives possessing a legitimate authority emanating from the consent of the electorate. A constituent assembly is a better choice than a constitutional convention. The Shengo may serve as a constituent assembly, or it may convene a separately elected constituent body. Either path should include regional hearings, diaspora submissions, publication in major languages, and sufficient time for public response.

The Shengo should provide guidelines to the constitution drafting commission concerning the substantive content of the new constitution. Protected principles include equal citizenship based on the supremacy of individual rights, territorial integrity subject to lawful constitutional procedures, federal or devolved unitary self-government, civilian control of force, judicial independence including a constitutional court, political competition, property and livelihood protection, and periodic elections. Institutional choices—parliamentary or presidential, electoral formula, working languages, territorial structure, land regime, language policy, economic system, and mode of constitutional

review—should remain open to deliberation (see CECA, 2026a, for the details of our view on constitutional process and content).

Ratification should require both popular and territorially distributed support. A bare national majority should not be permitted to redesign the federation over concentrated opposition, while no single region should possess a unilateral veto over the entire settlement.

Transitional justice, assets, and economic continuity

A truth, justice, and reconciliation commission must distinguish grave crimes, ordinary political responsibility, and mere membership in a former organization. Independent investigators and special chambers should address atrocity crimes, command responsibility, torture, unlawful detention, and major corruption. In the spirit of restorative justice, conditional amnesty may be available for lesser offenses linked to truth, restitution, demobilization, and non-recurrence.

Victims require acknowledgment, participation, reparation, and secure return. Armed movements should disclose detention sites and missing persons. No side should investigate only its adversaries. The credibility of the process will be measured by whether abuses committed by guarantor forces are subject to the same law as abuses committed by the former regime or separatist formations.

Public and ruling party assets

Collapse creates extreme risk of looting, document destruction, capital flight, and insider transfer. An emergency asset-preservation order should freeze extraordinary disposal of state, party-affiliated, and disputed enterprises. A State and Party Assets Commission should inventory beneficial ownership, liabilities, employment obligations, pension claims, and links to public finance.

Unlawfully acquired public assets, especially by the EPRDF and PP under the disguise of charitable endowments, should be recovered through due process. Legitimate private property should be protected. Enterprises should continue operating under temporary professional management where closure would destroy value or employment. Reprivatization of land, state enterprises, and party enterprises belongs to the later constitutional and legislative settlement, supported by valuation, competition, and social-protection institutions. A free media is essential for exposing abuses.

Economic recovery and state-private partnership

The immediate economic priorities are food security, public-service restoration, currency and banking continuity, reopening transport corridors, rehabilitation of displaced citizens, and repair of productive assets. Emergency policy should not become an ideological shock program.

The end game is to replace crony capitalism by a properly regulated market-based, private ownership mixed economy. Public authority supplies security, law, infrastructure, education, and strategic coordination; autonomous industrial firms and commercial farms undertake productive investment; economic rents are tied to measurable performance; and no party controls privileged access to land, credit, procurement, or licenses.

External support and recognition

External actors cannot manufacture Ethiopian legitimacy, but they can verify commitments, monitor ceasefires, finance humanitarian work and DDR, support public administration, and deter foreign intervention. The African Union and IGAD should be invited as facilitators and witnesses, with selected UN support for verification, humanitarian coordination, technical DDR assistance, and electoral preparation.

International recognition should follow performance rather than diplomatic preference. Relevant indicators include protection of civilians, access for aid, preservation of the central bank and public records, publication of decisions and accounts, adherence to the Charter tenets and timetable, and demonstrated transfer of authority to representative institutions.

Timetable and benchmarks

A national dialogue commission completes the draft compact or Charter, identifies NCW candidates and alternates, maps public-service and security contacts, prepares protected communications, and seeks advance commitments for monitoring and humanitarian support. It conducts simulations without proclaiming sovereign authority.

Period One: days 0–30

The Charter activates; the NCW, caretaker cabinet, and JSJM are constituted; critical institutions and records are secured; a public rights declaration is issued; humanitarian corridors and local ceasefires begin; extraordinary asset transfers are frozen; and all signatories disclose command contacts and detention sites. The overriding test is whether citizens experience less violence and more continuity than under uncoordinated collapse.

Period Two: days 31–180

Regional and local compacts expand; forces and heavy weapons are mapped; separation and controlled cantonment begin; the audit institutions operate; political prisoners receive lawful review; party activity and media freedoms reopen; and the framework for Transitional Shengo elections is enacted. The NCW publishes monthly implementation and finance reports.

Period Three: months 6–18

The Transitional Shengo is elected and constituted, assumes legislative and oversight authority, takes over the caretaker government, establishes reform commissions, and reviews the security architecture. The NCW transfers governing power. Security integration and demobilization proceed according to verified reciprocity.

Period Four: months 18–36

The constitutional process concludes, a permanent security chain is enacted, territorial and land questions are decided through authorized institutions, and ordinary elections are held. All exceptional guarantor powers expire automatically to end the bank-and-tank syndrome for good. Any extension requires a supermajority of the Shengo, and a fixed new date.

TWO ROADMAPS MEET AT A HISTORIC CROSSROADS

The transition to a modern Ethiopian society necessitates forging a formidable coalition that is anchored in two key political actors: the Amhara People's Movement (APM) and the Ethiopian People's Movement (EPM). These two differ markedly from the narrowly based ethnocentric confederalists or secessionists that have dominated Ethiopian politics for the past thirty-five years.

The APM, walking on the two legs of Fanno armed self-defense and non-violent civil disobedience, seeks to reconcile ethnonationalism and Ethiopian nationalism. The EPM, still nascent, has immense potential for mounting a people's resistance movement and is uncompromising in its commitment to national unity, the rule of law, and democratic equality.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon Amhara nationalists and Ethiopian nationalists alike to align each other's strategic roadmap to forge a robust coalition around a shared agenda of equal citizenship and national unity. The governing principle for this coalition is enforceable systemic transition without permanent guardianship. Violence-capable actors open the door because no one else can. Free and sovereign citizens ultimately decide what passes through it to reach the promised land of Ethiopian democracy and prosperity. Let us learn from the past but fix our attention on an inspiring future.

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ADDENDA:

1. 2026a: A Democratic Constitution
2. 2026b: The National Council of the Wise

